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Abstract
The cloud-computing paradigm has been driving the cloud-leveraged refactoring of existing information and
communications technology services, including voice over IP (VoIP). In this paper, we design a prototype secure
mobile VoIP (mVoIP) service with the open-source Asterisk private branch exchange (PBX) software, using Docker
lightweight virtualization for mobile devices with the immutable concept of continuous integration and continuous
deployment (CI/CD). In addition, the secure mVoIP service provides protection against eavesdropping and
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, using secure voice coding and real-time migration. We also experimentally verify the
quality of the secure voice and the associated communication delay over a distributed global connectivity
environment to protect against eavesdropping and real-time migration to mitigate DoS attacks.
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1 Introduction
Recently, cloud computing has become one of the hottest
keywords in the information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) sector [1]. Cloud computing is a kind of
Internet-based computing service that provides shared
computing resources (computing, networking, and stor-
age) and data to computers and other devices on demand.
In addition, Docker lightweight virtualization (i.e., con-
tainerization) is quickly emerging from the Linux camp.
Cloud computing is a means of innovation to change an
enterprise’s business environment, allowing it to evolve
into an IT service model. When associated with a busi-
ness, cloud computing can add value through business
agility, operational efficiency, and infrastructure stability.
In addition, the existing legacy application software can be
made to evolve in the IT service model through the stabil-
ity of the IT infrastructure. The existing ICT service and
solution provider can add value in the move from a hard-
ware (HW)-centric approach to a software (SW)-centric
approach. The ability to constantly grow by evolving the
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service delivery approaches that generate stable revenue
is important. In summary, the exploding cloud-computing
paradigm has been driving the cloud-leveraged refactor-
ing of existing ICT services. In this paper, to check the
merit of a cloud native computing paradigm, we select
the example of secure mobile voice over IP (mVoIP).
That is, we attempt to apply the power of cloud comput-
ing to improve the security of voice communications in
smartphones. We attempt to support secure mVoIP as a
software-as-a-service (SaaS) application. Thus, we design
prototype secure mobile VoIP services with the open-
source Asterisk private branch exchange (PBX) SW by
employing Docker lightweight virtualization for mobile
devices with the immutable concept of continuous inte-
gration (CI)/continuous delivery (CD) [2, 3]. In addi-
tion, the proposed secure mVoIP service supports pro-
tection against eavesdropping and denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks using secure voice coding and real-time migra-
tion. We also experimentally verify the quality of the
secure voice and the associated communication delay over
a distributed global connectivity environment in a domes-
tic/international zone to protect against eavesdropping
and real-time migration to mitigate DoS attacks.
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2 Related work
In this section, we describe the related basic concepts of
mVoIP, voice over long-term evolution (VoLTE), security
aspects, and service quality in VoIP, Docker lightweight
virtualization with CI/CD to implement a secure mobile
VoIP, 5G, and Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure
(ACI).
2.1 mVoIP, PBX SW Asterisk, and VoLTE
VoIP [4] is a methodology that combines technologies
to deliver voice communication and multimedia sessions
over the Internet (Internet protocol (IP) networks). VoIP
systems employ signaling protocols and session controls
to control the voice signaling, setup, and tear down of
the communication calls (Fig. 1). It transports an audio
stream over IP networks using special media delivery pro-
tocols to encode voice, audio, video with specific audio
codecs, and video codecs as digital streamable media.
The various codecs exist to optimize the media stream-
ing based on the application requirements and network
bandwidth; some of the implementations rely on nar-
rowband and compressed speech, while others support
high-fidelity stereo codecs. VoIP is available on smart-
phones, PCs, and other Internet-enabled devices. How-
ever, due to the current political and social situation,
eavesdropping security incidents are on the rise. In par-
ticular, the US NSA has been suspected of tapping the
German Chancellor’s phone for more than 10 years, and it
has recently been confirmed that the Chinese leaders have
also been the target of eavesdropping. To support secure
voice communication using VoIP, we examine the ways
of guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) of VoIP and
surveying security issues associated with VoIP. The min-
imum response strategy and network tuning for specific
parameters (e.g., packet loss, packet delay in transmis-
sion, jitter, and others) are required to guarantee the
QoS of voice communication over the IP network. mVoIP
is an extension of VoIP with mobility support [5]. Two
types of communication are generally supported: (i) short-
range or campus communication with cordless/digital
enhanced cordless telecommunications (DECT)/physical
coding sublayer (PCS) protocols where all base stations
are linked into the same local area network (LAN) and (ii)
wide-area communications using 3G/4G/5G protocols.
Fig. 1 Voice data processing in a VoIP system [10]
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There are several methodologies that allow a mobile
handset to be integrated into a VoIP network. One imple-
mentation turns the mobile device into a standard session
initiation protocol (SIP) client, which uses a data network
to send and receive SIPmessaging and the real-time trans-
port protocol (RTP) for the voice traffic. This method-
ology requires minimum support from a mobile handset
and high-speed IP communication. The standard VoIP
protocols (typically SIP) can be used over any broadband
IP-capable wireless network connection. Lastly, Asterisk
[6] is a SW implementation of a telephone PBX; it allows
attached telephones to make calls to one another and to
connect to other telephone services, such as the public
switched telephone network (PSTN) andVoIP services. Its
name is inspired by the asterisk symbol “*.”
VoLTE is a network-based IP Multimedia Subsystem
(IMS) with specific profiles for the control plane and
media plane of a voice service on LTE as defined by the
GSMA in PRD IR.92 [7]. The result of this approach is
voice service (control and media planes) delivery as a
flow of data within the LTE data bearer. This means that
there is no dependency on (or, ultimately, requirement for)
maintaining the legacy circuit-switched voice network.
VoLTE has a greater capacity for voice and data, up to a
factor of 3 compared with 3G universal mobile telecom-
munications systems (UMTS), and up to a factor of 6
compared with 2G global systems for mobile communi-
cations (GSM). Furthermore, it saves bandwidth because
VoLTE’s packet headers are smaller than in unoptimized
VoIP/LTE [8].
2.2 Security issues and service quality of VoIP
Ruck [9] and the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) [10] published documents on the security
and QoS of VoIP. They noted 10 security issues relating to
VoIP security as follows.
• Issue 1: VoIP traffic might be Internet bound.
• Issue 2: Gateway security options for VoIP are limited.
• Issue 3: Patching problems.
• Issue 4: VoIP security is only as reliable as the
underlying network security.
• Issue 5: Many call-processing systems run on
common operating systems (OSs), and they have
their own security issues to worry about.
• Issue 6: DoS takes down telephony.
• Issue 7: Eavesdropping on calls using VOMIT or
SipTap.
• Issue 8: Spam over IP telephony (SPIT).
• Issue 9: More ports open means more ports to secure.
• Issue 10: Wireless phones require advanced wireless
security.
NIST summarized these problems into seven items for
QoS issues in VoIP: latency, jitter, packet loss, bandwidth
and effective bandwidth, throughput speed, power fail-
ure and backup systems, and QoS implementations for
security.
With regard to VoIP security, in this study, we focus
on eavesdropping (issue 7) and DoS attacks (issue 6).
Eavesdropping is secretly listening to the private conver-
sations of others without their consent. DoS attacks are an
attempt to make a machine or network resource become
unavailable to its intended users, such as temporarily or
indefinitely interrupting or suspending the services of a
host connected to the Internet.
2.3 Docker lightweight virtualization technology and CI/CD
Docker [11] is an open-source project that automates
the integration and deployment of applications inside
software containers by providing an additional layer of
abstraction and automation of OS-level virtualization
on Linux. To avoid overhead from starting and main-
taining virtual machines, Docker uses the resource iso-
lation features of the Linux kernel such as cgroups
and kernel namespaces, and a union-capable filesys-
tem such as aufs and others to allow independent
“containers” to run within a single Linux instance.
The Linux kernel’s namespaces support mostly iso-
lates an application’s view of the operating environ-
ment, (e.g., user IDs, process trees, network, and
mounted file systems), while the kernel’s cgroups pro-
vide resource limiting (e.g., CPU, memory, block I/O,
and network). Recently, there has been a trend to
replace the hypervisor [12] with Docker for virtualization.
Figure 2 illustrates the differences between hypervisor
and Docker.
CI means that whenever a developer checks in code to
the source repository, a build is automatically triggered as
shown in Fig. 3. If the build and automated unit tests are
successful, CD takes this one step further by automatically
deploying the application to an environment for more
in-depth testing.
Figure 4 presents the registration step, payment step,
key distribution step, and deployment step from the
secure mVoIP service. It is shown that user A registers
their information and makes a payment (see Fig. 4 (1)).
The key distribution system sends the public key of user
A to the storage server and the private key to user A (see
Fig. 4 (2) and (3), respectively). Note that secure shell
(SSH) with a session based on public key cryptography
is used in the registration step. Figure 4 also presents
the deployment of PBX using Docker virtualization. User
A accesses the storage server using the private key and
downloads the Docker-based PBX container as SaaS (see
Fig. 4 (4) and (5)). Then, user A sets up the downloaded
PBX container (see Fig. 4 (6)), and finally, user A sends the
mVoIP app to user B (see Fig. 4 (7)) to enable the secure
voice communication.
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Fig. 2 Difference between virtualization (with hypervisor) and containerization (with Docker)
2.4 5G wireless systems and Cisco ACI
The 5G technology [13, 14] will provide further services
and added benefits to the world compared with 4G. It
will provide very high bandwidth, which the user will not
have experienced previously. It also has many advanced
features which makes it a powerful tool for wireless com-
munication. By pushing 5G into VoIP-enabled devices,
users will experience a level of data transmission and call
volume as never before. Moreover, 5G technology will
offer highQoS inmany fields such as product engineering,
Fig. 3 Detailed diagram of CI processing
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Fig. 4 Concept diagram of the registration and deployment of a secure mVoIP service
Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Everything (IoE),
All to One (AtO), Industrial IoT (I2oT), and electronic
transactions (e-payments, e-tickets, and e-transactions).
IT departments and the associated businesses are look-
ing for cloud automation tools and software-defined net-
working (SDN) [15] architectures to:
• Accelerate application delivery
• Reduce operating costs
• Greatly increase business agility
Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) [16] is
a comprehensive SDN-based architecture. The policy-
based automation solution of Cisco ACI supports
a business-relevant application policy language and
provides greater scalability through a distributed enforce-
ment system and greater network visibility. These benefits
are realized through the integration of physical and vir-
tual environments under one policy model for networks,
servers, storage, services, and security.
3 Design and implementation of Docker-based
securemVoIP with CI/CD
To support CI/CD with lightweight virtualization for
secure mVoIP, the secure mVoIP based on Docker can
be implemented by utilizing the open-source PBX SW
Asterisk with HW on a single board or PC instance of
high-performance servers. Figure 5 shows the HW plat-
form testbed of the PBX SW Asterisk from single-board
Fig. 5 HW platform testbed of the PBX SW Asterisk. a Raspberry Pi. b Cubie-Board 2. c Cubie-Board 3. d NUC. e i7 PC board. f Dell servers
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Raspberry Pi 2 to Dell servers. The single-board Rasp-
berry Pi 2, Cubie-Board 2, and Cubie-Board 3 are
standalone-based mVoIP platforms. The Intel NUC, Intel
i7 PC, andDell servers are cloud andDocker-basedmVoIP
platforms. Figure 6 shows the architecture of the Docker-
based PBX SW Asterisk [6] and dashboard FreePBX [17].
As shown in Fig. 6, Dockerfile [18] keywords used to gen-
erate the Docker image are presented. Docker can build
images automatically by reading the instructions from a
Dockerfile, a text file that contains all the commands, in
order, needed to build a given image. Dockerfiles support
the functions of CI/CD. Dockerfiles adhere to a specific
format and use a specific set of instructions.
To support a secure mVoIP app (cf. issue 7 in
Section 2.2), Fig. 6 (a) shows the continuous deliv-
ery server with generated images using the Dockerfile.
Figure 6 (b) shows the architecture of the Docker-based
PBX SW Asterisk and dashboard FreePBX in the backend
server. As shown in Fig. 6 (c), Dockerfile keywords used to
generate the Docker image are presented. The functions
of the Dockerfile support CI/CD. The idea behind CI/CD
is that we should create jobs that perform certain opera-
tions such as building, testing, delivering, and deploying.
Those jobs should be linked together to create a CI/CD
pipeline.
The main concept of Docker is the immutable
infrastructure concept that extends CI/CD as shown in
Fig. 6, and the features of the immutable infrastructure are
summarized as follows: manageability, scalability, testa-
bility, and portability. Figure 6 (d) and (e) show the user
interface (UI) screen of the secure mVoIP app based on
an Android device for a secure voice communication
service. In particular, to prevent eavesdropping on calls
using VOMIT or SipTap, Fig. 6 (d) shows the secure key
generation process to support secure voice communica-
tion including the steps of voice sampling, white-noise
removal, and secure key generation [19].
4 Verification of the secure voice test to protect
against eavesdropping and the global
communication test of secure mVoIP
In this section, we perform verification testing between
the user’s original voice and the user’s secure voice for
respectively real voice communication and secure voice
communication testing of global and domestic communi-
cation environments using the developed secure mVoIP
based on Docker.
4.1 Verification of the secure voice test to protect against
eavesdropping
We performed the verification testing of secure voice
communication to protect against eavesdropping using
an Android-based secure mVoIP app and Docker-based
PBX SW Asterisk with a PC to support lightweight
virtualization. Figures 7 and 8 show the verification of
Fig. 6 Diagram of the immutable infrastructure for Docker-based secure mVoIP. a CD server. b Dockerfile and image generation of service operation
environment. c Asterisk PBX server. d User A. e User B
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Fig. 7 Original and secured voices (user A)
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Fig. 8 Original and secured voices and their FFT versions. a Normal voice. b FFT of normal voice. c Secure voice. d FFT of secure voice
the secure voice test to protect against eavesdropping
by original voice and secure voice. Figure 7 presents the
user’s original voice and the user’s secure voice through
the secure mVoIP app. The third column of Fig. 7 shows
the locations of the original voices (blue squares) and the
secure voices (red diamonds) with regard to the average
(x-axis) and standard deviation (y-axis) to demonstrate
objectivity. The distances between original voice and
secure voice intuitively demonstrate the security of voice
communication. Figure 8 shows the user’s original voice
and secure voice. Figure 8a, b present respectively the
original voice and fast Fourier transformation (FFT
[20]) signal of the original voice. Figure 8c, d present
respectively the secure voice and FFT signal of the secure
voice. Figure 9 presents a comparison between original
voices and secure voices (mean and standard deviation),
and Fig. 10 shows the distribution comparison between
original voice and secure voice by FFT.
4.2 Verification of the domestic voice communication test
The domestic real voice communication test of the secure
mVoIP was conducted between the metropolitan areas
of Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu, Gangneung, or Jeju Island
and Gwangju metro-city as shown in Fig. 11. The real
voice two-way communication speed is approximately
distributed in the range from 133 to 145 ms as shown in
Table 1. Figure 12 shows the results of 100 iterations of the
network traffic delay test between secure mVoIP apps in
Gwangju metro-city.
4.3 Verification of the voice communication test in
South-East Asia
The real voice communication test of the secure mVoIP in
South-East Asia was conducted between Malaysia, Myan-
mar, or Okinawa and Gwangju metro-city as shown in
Fig. 11. Table 2 presents the real voice communication
test results between Gwangju metro-city and Okinawa.
The real voice two-way communication speed is approx-
imately distributed in the range of minimum 78 ms and
maximum 181 ms. The real voice communication speed
between Gwangju metro-city and Malaysia are approxi-
mately distributed in the range of minimum 108 ms and
maximum 140ms as shown in Table 2. In addition, the real
voice communication speed between Gwangju metro-city
and Myanmar are approximately distributed in the range
of minimum 78 ms and maximum 175 ms.
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Fig. 9 Comparison between the original voice and secure voice (mean and standard deviation)
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Fig. 10 Distribution comparison between the original voice and secure voice by FFT
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Fig. 11 Global and domestic verification experiment: locations and connectivity
4.4 Verification of the voice communication test in
Europe
The real voice communication test of the secure mVoIP
in Europe was conducted between Brussels, Stockholm,
or Vienna and Gwangju metro-city as shown in Fig. 11.
Table 3 presents the real voice communication test results
between Brussels, Stockholm, and Vienna and Gwangju
Table 1 Experimental verification of the domestic voice
communication test results




Jeju Island 133 145
metro-city. The real voice two-way communication speed
in Europe is approximately 78 ms in all cases. In conclu-
sion, the real voice communication speed of the entire
European zone is consistent with that of the real voice
communication speed of the South-East Asian zone.
5 Cloud-based real-timemigration test of VoIP to
mitigate DoS attacks
A cloud-based mVoIP platform has the merits of cloud
computing, provisioning, elastic management, and vir-
tualization of resources in the cloud infrastructure. We
tested the real-time migration test of mVoIP during voice
communication to mitigate DoS attacks and assumed a
virtual scenario for any of the DoS attacks (cf. issue 6 of
Section 2.2). The strategy to mitigate or avoid DoS attacks
is to detour DoS attack traffic using real-time migration
among infrastructure resources. Figures 13 and 14 show
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Fig. 12 Network traffic delay test between secure mVoIP apps in Gwangju metro-city
a graph of the network traffic using Cacti [21] and the
data communication graph using FreePBX showing the
real-time migration between hosts. We observed a much
larger amount of network traffic and data communica-
tion during real-time migration than during settlement.
The real-time migration generates a burst of data types
between 15 and 10 s as shown in Fig. 13. In particular,
the migration traffic needs a higher level of bandwidth
only at the start of the migration as shown in Fig. 14. The
amount of real-time migration traffic itself requires less
bandwidth, but the absolute priority of real-time migra-
tion traffic should be guaranteed as critical traffic to
detour/avoid DoS attacks.
6 Conclusions
Recently, the paradigm of the computing environment
has changed, and following changes to the communi-
cation environment, VoIP technology is being revisited
Table 2 Voice communication test result between Gwangju
metro-city and South-East Asian locations




to support various services in the ICT field. In this
paper, we designed a prototype secure mVoIP service
with the open-source Asterisk PBX SW by employ-
ing Docker lightweight virtualization for mobile devices
with the immutable concept of CI/CD. In addition,
the secured mVoIP service supports protection against
eavesdropping and DoS attacks using secure voice cod-
ing and real-time migration. We also experimentally
verified the quality of the secure voice and the asso-
ciated communication delay over a distributed global
connectivity environment. In particular, the global real
voice communication test was conducted in both South-
East Asia and Europe. The real voice communication
speed of the entire European zone was consistent,
and the real communication speed of the South-East
Asian zone was variable. We have shown that real-
time migration has the potential to provide DoS attack
mitigation.
Table 3 Voice communication test result between Gwangju
metro-city and Europe
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Fig. 13 Network traffic graph using Cacti
Fig. 14 Data communication graph using FreePBX
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